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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
SCOTT JEFFERY SAMS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43357
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-513
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Scott Jeffery Sams asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the published
opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2016 Opinion No. 60 (Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2016)
(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of
Conviction and Probation Order, is not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho
Supreme Court and is in conflict with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Specifically, the Opinion is contrary to the following decisions of the Idaho
Supreme Court: State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2008) (“[C]ompliance with
I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of other acts
evidence.”), as well as Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho

1

889, 893 (2011) (“The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the
statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the
statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does
not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)), and State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821 (1998) (“On review, rules of
evidence are treated like statutes.”) Thus, Mr. Sams asks this Court to grant his Petition
for Review and to ultimately vacate his conviction.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Sams by Information with aggravated assault, felony, in
violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-901(b) and 18-905(a), and use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of a crime, felony, in violation of I.C. § 19-2520. (R., pp.30-31.) Mr. Sams
entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.33.)
Mr. Sams exercised his right to a jury trial. (See R., pp.118-24, 126-29.) At
Mr. Sams’ jury trial, the following facts were adduced. Mr. Sams and Travis Ohlsson
had known each other for a few years (Tr., p.128, L.24 – p.129, L.3, p.262, L.24 –
p.263, L.10), and they arranged using the app Grindr that Mr. Ohlsson would spend a
weekend at Mr. Sams’ residence. (Tr., p.156, L.3 – p.157, L.9, p.262, L.13 – p.264, L.4,
p.268, L.25 – p.269, L.9.) Mr. Sams testified that he expected they would have sex
(Tr., p.269, Ls.10-12), but Mr. Ohlsson testified he asked to hang out and needed a
place to stay. (Tr., p.157, Ls.10-17.) Mr. Sams testified he and Mr. Ohlsson had sex
and got high after Mr. Ohlsson arrived at the house. (Tr., p.269, Ls.13-24.) While
Mr. Ohlsson testified he did not have any sexual contact with Mr. Sams (Tr., p.159,
Ls.8-12), Officer Andrew Linn of the Boise Police Department testified Mr. Ohlsson told
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him there was some sexual contact. (Tr., p.227, L.22 – p.228, L.8.) Mr. Sams further
testified that the morning of the following Monday, he awoke to Mr. Ohlsson sexually
penetrating him. (Tr., p.274, L.5 – p.275, L.17.)
Later that morning, Mr. Sams noticed the box of his HIV medication had gone
missing from his bedroom. (Tr., p.277, Ls.8-22.) Mr. Sams testified he confronted
Mr. Ohlsson about the missing pills, Mr. Ohlsson denied everything, and the two began
to argue. (Tr., p.282, L.25 – p.283, L.6.) Mr. Ohlsson stripped naked to show he did not
take anything, and then Mr. Ohlsson turned violent and began to shake Mr. Sams and
push him around. (Tr., p.284, L.20 – p.286, L.12.) While Mr. Ohlsson was shaking and
hitting him, Mr. Sams grabbed his show knife off a shelf. (Tr., p.286, L.15 – p.287,
L.25.) Mr. Sams told Mr. Ohlsson to get out of his house and give his stuff back.
(Tr., p.288, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Ohlsson then attacked Mr. Sams, and the two struggled over
the knife. (Tr., p.288, Ls.5-12.) Mr. Sams screamed for help. (Tr., p.288, Ls.17-18.)
Mr. Ohlsson took control of the knife and held it to Mr. Sams’ chin, causing an injury.
(Tr., p.288, L.22 – p.289, L.7.)
Mr. Ohlsson provided a different account of the incident. Mr. Ohlsson testified
Mr. Sams accused him of stealing the pills, but Mr. Ohlsson did not steal the pills and
was unaware they were in the house.

(Tr., p.133, L.24 – p.135, L.3.)

Mr. Sams

became agitated, and after Mr. Ohlsson offered to help find the pills, he noticed
Mr. Sams had a knife in his hand.

(Tr., p.135, L.4 – p.136, L.2, p.136, Ls.22-25.)

Mr. Sams continued to accuse Mr. Ohlsson of stealing the pills and stated he would gut
Mr. Ohlsson like a pig. (Tr., p.136, Ls.3-21.) Mr. Sams then told Mr. Ohlsson to strip
naked, and Mr. Ohlsson complied. (Tr., p.137, L.6 – p.138, L.8.) Mr. Sams threatened
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to kill Mr. Ohlsson (Tr., p.139, Ls.4-8), and then lunged at Mr. Ohlsson with the knife.
(Tr., p.140, Ls.13-15.) Mr. Ohlsson tried to get the knife away from Mr. Sams, and after
he got it, Mr. Sams started screaming for help.

(Tr., p.140, L.15 – p.141, L.10.)

Mr. Ohlsson later noticed he had a cut on his arm and some scratches. (Tr., p.146,
Ls.4-11.)
Mr. Sams and Mr. Ohlsson left the bedroom, and Mr. Ohlsson left the house
through the front door while Mr. Sams went to the garage to get a shovel. (Tr., p.141,
L.8 – p.142, L.17, p.293, L.16 – p.294, L.18.)

Mr. Sams subsequently threw

Mr. Ohlsson’s clothes out of the house. (Tr., p.146, Ls.3-9, p.294, Ls.19-25.) Mr. Sams’
roommate, who had been in the living room of the house, called 911. (Tr., p.188, L.8 –
p.191, L.23.) When the police arrived at the scene, they detained and questioned
Mr. Ohlsson (Tr., p.150, L.5 – p.152, L.17, p.222, Ls.3-21), and walked Mr. Sams’
roommate out of the house (Tr., p.192, Ls.2-6).
There was then a standoff between the police and Mr. Sams for about five hours.
Before the State’s opening statement, Mr. Sams requested the State not be allowed to
discuss the standoff with the officers in front of the jury, because Mr. Sams had not
been charged with resisting and obstructing and evidence of the standoff was irrelevant
and prejudicial. (Tr., p.109, L.22 – p.110, L.4.) The State argued the standoff was
evidence of consciousness of guilt and identity. (Tr., p.110, L.16 – p.111, L.5.)
The district court initially determined sufficient facts existed to find the standoff
happened. (Tr., p.113, Ls.17-19.) The district court determined the standoff could be
perceived as another wrong or act under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404 (hereinafter, Rule
404), and ruled under Rule 404(b) the information was admissible for a non-propensity
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purpose including identity or the absence of mistake or accident. (Tr., p.113, L.17 –
p.114, L.2.) The district court also determined the evidence was admissible under Rule
403 because it was not unduly prejudicial to Mr. Sams. (Tr., p.114, Ls.2-3.)
Mr. Sams then brought to the district court’s attention that he was entitled to
notice of the standoff evidence under Rule 404(b). (See Tr., p.114, Ls.24-25.) The
State argued the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence because it was part
and parcel to the incident, and it was not propensity evidence because it showed
Mr. Sams was not in the right state of mind when he refused to come out and speak
with law enforcement. (Tr., p.117, L.2 – p.118, L.6.) In response, Mr. Sams asserted
the evidence was prejudicial and irrelevant to the incident. (Tr., p.118, Ls.7-19.)
The district court recognized the State had not provided notice of its intent to
introduce Rule 404(b) evidence.

(Tr., p.118, Ls.20-22.)

The district court ruled

evidence that Mr. Sams was anti-authoritarian and thus had a propensity to commit
crimes was prohibited under Rule 404(a). (Tr., p.118, L.22 – p.119, L.1.) However, the
district court determined that certain parts of the standoff showed consciousness of guilt
and were parcel to the facts of the incident. (See Tr., p.119, Ls.2-5.) The district court
determined the police’s attempts to contact Mr. Sams during the standoff were not
character or Rule 404(b) evidence requiring notice. (Tr., p.119, Ls.9-15.)
In its opening statement, the State told the jury it would hear about the time
period before Mr. Sams was taken into custody.

(Tr., p.127, Ls.9-10.) During the

State’s case-in-chief, Mr. Sams’ roommate testified the police kept him away from the
house for about five hours, and when he returned the house had been ransacked.
(Tr., p.192, Ls.7-23.)

Officer Kirk Rush testified Mr. Sams did not respond to the
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officers’ initial attempts to contact him, but the officers eventually made contact with
Mr. Sams and took him into custody when he exited the house. (Tr., p.206, L.18 –
p.207, L.14.)
On direct examination, Mr. Sams testified he sent a kite out while he was in jail
requesting a picture be taken of his chin, but a picture was not taken. (Tr., p.289, L.12 –
p.291, L.7.) The State argued Mr. Sams thereby opened the door for inquiry into the
police response and his communications with the police. (Tr., p.297, L.16 – p.298, L.3.)
The district court determined Mr. Sams had opened the door to his interactions with the
police, including the police’s prior attempts to investigate the incident. (Tr., p.298, L.17
– p.299, L.10, p.301, Ls.2-8.)
Thus, on cross-examination, Mr. Sams testified he had locked himself in the
bathroom and initially did not know the police had arrived. (Tr., p.305, Ls.16-22.) He
was unaware of calls to his cell phone about half an hour into the standoff, because he
had no idea where his phone was. (See Tr., p.306, Ls.14-22.) About an hour later,
Mr. Sams looked outside the window and saw the police. (Tr., p.306, L.23 – p.307, L.3.)
The police tried to get his attention with their PA system, and Mr. Sams subsequently
went to the back door of the house and made contact with law enforcement. (Tr., p.307,
Ls.4-23.) The police asked Mr. Sams to come outside several times, but he remained
inside the house. (Tr., p.307, L.24 – p.309, L.23.) At one point, the police threw a
phone through a window so a negotiator could talk with Mr. Sams. (Tr., p.310, Ls.4-17.)
Mr. Sams was arrested when he eventually went outside. (Tr., p.310, Ls.18-24.)
The jury acquitted Mr. Sams of felony aggravated assault and of the lesserincluded offense of misdemeanor assault. (See Tr., p.380, L.20 – p.381, L.13; R., 159.)
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The jury found Mr. Sams guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor disturbing
the peace. (Tr., p.380, L.20 – p.381, L.2; R., p.159.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Sams to 180 days jail time, with credit for 107
days served and 73 days suspended. (Tr., p.393, Ls.1-19; R., p.163.) The district court
placed Mr. Sams on probation for a period of two years.

(Tr., p.393, Ls.19-21;

R., p.163.) Mr. Sams filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment
of Conviction and Probation Order. (R., pp.168-70.)1
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.
(Opinion, p.5.) The Court of Appeals determined “[t]he term ‘acts’ or the phrase ‘other
acts’” in Rule 404(b) “encompass every fact in the case as opposed to the facts relating
to the physical assault itself.” (Opinion, p.4.) According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he
evidence at question here has nothing to do with propensity, and thus, is not the type of
evidence for which Rule 404(b) notice must be given.” (Opinion, pp.4-5.)
The Court of Appeals also stated Rule 404(b) “recognizes that evidence of ‘other
crimes, wrongs, or acts’ may bear upon character.”

(Opinion, p.5.)

The Court of

Appeals determined “[t]he evidence at issue here simply does not fall in the
I.R.E. § 404(b) concept of ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts.’ The term ‘acts’ encompasses
acts similar in nature to crimes or wrongs and which invoke propensity towards such
About three months later, the State filed a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation
Violation. (R., pp.173-74.) The district court revoked probation and ordered Mr. Sams
to serve the previously-suspended jail sentence. (Order Revoking Probation, Judgment
of Conviction (Misdemeanor) and Commitment, Nov. 12, 2015.) The district court later
approved the request by the Ada County’s Sheriff’s Office that Mr. Sams be granted
early release time. (Approval of 5 Days of Early Release, Dec. 22, 2015.) Mr. Sams is
currently not on the Ada County Jail’s Inmate Roster. See Inmate Roster, Ada County
Sheriff’s Office, https://adasheriff.org/webapps/sheriff/reports/inmates (last accessed
Oct. 11, 2016).
1
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action and related bad character.” (Opinion, p.5.) The Court of Appeals wrote, “[a]s to
the context of words, Idaho appellate courts have applied the maxim noscitur a sociis,
which means ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’” (Opinion, p.5 n.3 (quoting
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (2001)). The Court of Appeals determined “the
evidence at issue was not offered or admitted to prove character.”

(Opinion, p.5.)

Thus, the Court of Appeals determined “I.R.E. § 404(b) and its notice provisions do not
apply.” (Opinion, p.5.)
Mr. Sams filed a Petition for Review.
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ISSUE
Should this Court grant Mr. Sams’ Petition for Review and ultimately vacate
his conviction?

9

ARGUMENT
This Court Should Grant Mr. Sams’ Petition For Review And Vacate His Conviction
A.

Introduction
Mr. Sams asserts the Idaho Court of Appeals’ Opinion is not in accord with

applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and is in conflict with previous
decisions of the Court of Appeals. Thus, this Court should grant Mr. Sams’ Petition for
Review and ultimately vacate his conviction.
B.

There Are Special And Important Reasons For This Court To Exercise Its
Discretion And Grant Review
“Granting a petition for review from a final decision of the Court of Appeals is

discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons and a majority of the Justices direct that the petition be
granted.” I.A.R. 118(b). Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) includes a non-exhaustive list of
factors the Court should consider when determining whether or not to grant review.
I.A.R. 118(b)(1)-(5). Factors include “[w]hether the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho
Supreme Court or of the United States Supreme Court,” and “[w]hether the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a previous decision of the Court of
Appeals.” I.A.R. 118(b)(2) & (3).
Mr. Sams asserts there are special and important reasons for this Court to grant
review, because the Opinion is not in accord with applicable decisions of this Court and
is in conflict with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals.

The Idaho Rules of

Evidence provide that character or propensity evidence is not admissible: “Evidence of
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other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b). However,
other acts evidence may
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and
serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
such evidence it intended to introduce at trial.
Id.
Here, the Court of Appeals determined “[t]he term ‘acts’ or the phrase ‘other
acts’” in Rule 404(b) do not “encompass every fact in the case as opposed to the facts
relating to the physical assault itself.” (Opinion, p.4.) The Court of Appeals noted
Rule 404(b) “is principally designed to protect against admission of purely propensity
evidence. The evidence at question here has nothing to do with propensity, and thus, is
not the type of evidence of which Rule 404(b) notice must be given.” (Opinion, pp.4-5.)
However, the Court of Appeals’ determination that non-propensity other acts
evidence is not subject to the notice requirements of Rule 404(b) is contrary to this
Court’s decision in State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008). In Sheldon, this Court
observed Rule 404(b) “allows admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes
other than showing propensity, ‘provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file
and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intended to introduce at trial.’” Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230. The Sheldon Court held
“compliance with I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of
other acts evidence.” Id. Thus, the Opinion is not in accord with Sheldon.
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The Court of Appeals further determined Rule 404(b) “recognizes that evidence
of ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ may bear upon character. The evidence at issue here
simply does not fall in the I.R.E. § 404(b) concept of ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts.’”
(Opinion, p.5.) The Court of Appeals determined “[t]he term ‘acts’ encompasses acts
similar in nature to crimes or wrongs and which invoke propensity toward such action
and related bad character.” (Opinion, p.5.) Also taking into account “the evidence at
issue was not offered or admitted to prove character,” the Court of Appeals determined
“I.R.E. § 404(b) and its notice provisions do not apply.” (Opinion, p.5.)
The Court of Appeals’ determination the standoff evidence at issue here did not
constitute other acts evidence within the scope of Rule 404(b) is not in accord with
applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court.

This Court has held “[t]he

interpretation of a statute must being with the literal words of the statute; those words
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it,
but simply follows the law as written.” Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, this
Court has held “[o]n review, rules of evidence are treated like statutes.” State v. Moore,
131 Idaho 814, 822 (1998).
The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the scope of Rule 404(b) runs counter to
this Court’s decisions in Verska and Moore. Based on Moore, the interpretation of
Rule 404(b) on review must follow the rules of statutory interpretation this Court outlined
in Verska. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893; Moore, 131 Idaho at 822. The Court of
Appeals’ determination that “[t]he term ‘acts’ encompasses acts similar in nature to
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crimes or wrongs and which invoke propensity toward such action and related bad
character” (Opinion, p.5), conflicts with Verska’s holding that the words of a statute or
rule “must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning.” See Verska, 151 Idaho at
893. “Act” has been defined as “[s]omething done or performed, esp. voluntarily; a
deed.”

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

Nothing in the “literal words” of

Rule 404(b) indicates the term “acts” should instead be read to only encompass “acts
similar in nature to crimes or wrongs and which invoke propensity towards such action
and related bad character.” See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893.
The Court of Appeals’ reading of Rule 404(b) is also in conflict with previous
decisions of the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949
(Ct. App. 2012) (“Although Idaho appellate courts have commonly used the terms ‘prior
bad acts evidence’ or ‘other bad acts evidence’ as shorthand to refer to evidence
governed by Rule 404(b), we have noted that the rule is not limited to ‘bad’ acts.”);
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190 (Ct. App. 2011) (“Norton is correct that Rule 404(b)
is not limited to ‘bad’ acts. Rather, the rule encompasses ‘other crimes, wrongs, or
acts.’”)
Additionally, the Court of Appeals’ use of the rules of statutory construction to
interpret Rule 404(b) is not in accord with Verska. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals
stated, “[a]s to the context of words, Idaho appellate courts have applied the maxim
noscitur a sociis, which means ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’” (Opinion,
p.5 n.3 (quoting State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (2001).)
But the Court of Appeals’ use of the maxim to support its reading of Rule 404(b)
goes against this Court’s decision in Verska. This Court has described noscitur a sociis
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as a “method of statutory construction . . . often wisely applied where a word is capable
of many meanings.” State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004). The Verska Court held “that
where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the
legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction.” Verska, 151
Idaho at 895 (quoting Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai Cnty., 98 Idaho 925, 928
(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Before Verska, this Court likewise held that
if the statutory language is unambiguous, “there is no occasion to consider rules of
statutory construction.” St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd., v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 146 Idaho
753, 755 (2009). Without any determination the words of Rule 404(b) are ambiguous,
the Opinion’s use of noscitur a sociis is therefore not in accord with this Court’s decision
in Verska. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895.
The Court of Appeals’ Opinion is not in accord with applicable decisions of this
Court and in conflict with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals. Thus, there are
special and important reasons for this Court to grant review.
C.

If This Court Grants Review, It Should Ultimately Vacate Mr. Sams’ Conviction
Mr. Sams asserts that if this Court grants review, it should analyze Rule 404(b)

using the correct standards for interpreting statutes and rules.

For the reasons

contained in the initial briefing (App. Br., pp.8-17; Reply Br., pp.4-10), which are
incorporated herein by reference, this Court should hold that the standoff evidence was
evidence of other acts subject to the strictures of Rule 404(b). Because the State failed
to serve notice, the standoff evidence was inadmissible. The district court’s ultimate
determination admitting the standoff evidence on the basis it was not Rule 404(b)
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evidence, despite the court’s earlier ruling, was arbitrary and outside the boundaries of
the court’s discretion. The State has not proven the district court’s error in admitting the
standoff evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, this Court should
ultimately vacate Mr. Sams’ conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Sams respectfully requests that his Petition for
Review be granted, with the result that his judgment of conviction be vacated and the
case remanded.
DATED this 13th day of October, 2016.

____________/s/_____________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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